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ABSTRACT This study examines the tax-arbitrage possibilities on the Budapest 
Stock Exchange between 1995 and 2007. The theoretical possibility for the 
arbitrage is the different taxation for different stockholders, for the private 
investors and for the institutions: the institutions had higher taxation on capital 
gain while private persons in the whole period had tax-benefits on capital gains. 
The dynamic clientele model shows, that there is a range of the price drops after 
dividend payouts which guarantees a risk-free profit for both parties. The research 
is based on the turnover data from 97 companies listed on the Budapest Stock 
Exchange. We have tested the significant turnovers around the dividend-dates. 
The study presents clear evidence that investors continuously did take advantages 
on the different taxation. 
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The focus of debates about dividend policy is whether any given extent 
of dividend pay-out creates added value for shareholders – i.e., whether any 
price change is induced by such alterations of the dividend level that are 
announced currently or expected in the future. At the most basic level, the 
main problem concerning dividend policy is whether to pay out profits as 
dividends or to plow the money back into the company as reinvestment. It 
seems that several factors influence firms’ dividend policy: risk, taxes, costs, 
information, shareholders, clienteles, shareholders’ behavior etc. We will 
only deal with the tax effects.
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Modigliani and Miller’s famous model is a key point in these debates. The 
model did not rely on actual practice, but was built upon a purely theoretical 
set of conditions, assuming perfect capital markets and rational investors.3
The key conclusion of the model was that investors’ attitude toward dividend 
policy is indifferent as regards the generation of shareholder value; they saw 
no difference between getting their earnings through the profitable operations 
of the company via dividend pay-outs or from increased prices after earnings 
are plowed back  into the company.
From the late 1960s, a new school emerged which actually brought the 
minimization of the dividend into the foreground, the so-called radical left 
wing. Their argumentation focused on the different rates of capital gains taxes 
and taxes on dividends. In the United States, tax was imposed on dividends in 
a similar way as to the Hungarian personal income tax consolidated tax base, 
and only capital gains tax was thought of as being related to separate incomes. 
Due to this fact, dividends were taxed progressively along with the investor’s 
other income streams, including wages and salaries from labor relations. 
On the other hand, the majority of the various progressive tax rates, which 
naturally applied to a great extent to those who had the largest incomes, and 
therefore were capable of investing – exceeded the effective rate of capital 
gains tax, meaning that incomes received as dividends were prejudiced against 
from a tax perspective. The point of the radical dividend-cutting position was 
that, as long as the owners of the company paid more taxes on dividends than 
on capital gains, any dividend pay-out meant losses of assets for shareholders 
to the extent which corresponded to the actual tax disadvantages. Therefore, 
it seemed expedient to minimize dividend payments, or defer them to 
optimal cases, and furthermore to eliminate them fully in extreme cases, and 
to completely re-orient shareholders towards preferring cash withdrawals 
through selling their shares. 
3  Assumptions regarding the perfect market: there is no taxation or governmental intervention, 
all the actors accept the prices, there are no monopolistic or oligopolistic positions, there is 
free entrance and exit in relation to markets and perfect access to information, i.e., the market 
efficiently functions. Investor rationality means that maximization of investor utility involves 
the maximization of assets and minimization of risks. The model and its consequences can be 
seen in more detail in Jaksity [1991].  
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1. CLIENTELE MODELS ESTABLISHED
ON THE BASIS OF TAX IMPLICATIONS
Models relying on tax implications can be divided into two main groups:
– models relying solely on tax implications;
–  models examining the combined effects of taxes and other factors (risk, 
information etc.).
This part focuses exclusively on the first group. Models relying on tax 
implications are excellently categorized in the study by Judit Kosárka [2007], 
and thus most of this chapter makes use of her work, which represents an 
extensive resource.
According to related literature, a situation clientele model is one which, on 
the basis of various preferences, investors opt for different companies, and 
thus companies see the emergence of their own steady clienteles and circles 
of investors.
The grouping options of clientele models established on the basis of tax 
implications are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1  Models for examination of tax implications on dividend policy
Source: Fazakas & Kosárka [2008]
1.1. Static models
Static models analyze the influences within a given investment environment 
– how investors can adapt themselves to given tax rates with any specific 
corporate dividend policy, and how this is reflected in share prices. The static 
investor strategy means that with an unchanged dividend policy in equilibrium, 
investors do not trade their securities, but maintain their positions. (Brennan 
[1970], Litzenberger & Ramaswamy [1980], [1982])
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1.1.1 Simple static clientele models
A fundamental assumption of simple static models is that investors pay 
taxes on the basis of the same tax rate – both the rate of capital gains tax 
and the tax on dividends are identical for all stakeholders, but the tax rate on 
dividends are higher than the rate of capital gains tax for all investors. This 
is similar to the actual taxation situation in the United States where the tax 
rate on dividends tends to be larger. These models also suggest that shares 
with large dividend yields promise large, predictable after-tax earnings, and 
therefore represent greater value than shares paying smaller dividends which 
have higher growth rates. 
1.1.2. Traditional clientele models
In traditional clientele models, the marginal incomes of investors fall 
under various tax rate ranges, and therefore these investors have different 
dividend preferences. The relative tax advantage for investors with higher tax 
rates leads to a shift in payment demands towards capital gains, whereas the 
relative tax benefit for investors with lower-income tax rates leads to calls for 
dividend payouts. 
The way the tax rates of investors determine the after-tax value of the 
dividends of shares they acquire is hereby demonstrated on the basis of an 
Elton and Gruber publication (Elton & Gruber [1970]). In this classic model, 
investors are risk-neutral and their main objective is the maximization of 
their after-tax assets. Within the context of the model, there is an equilibrium 
situation when the investor is indifferent to acquiring a given share before 
or after dividend payment. In other words, this means that whether dividend 
payment or profit gain is opted for, the after-tax cash flow realized will be 
the same. 
The essence of the model is that, upon dividend payment, the expected 
drop in share price is less than the actual volume of the dividend; i.e., the 
decrease of the price in relation to the paid dividend reflects the relative tax 
disadvantages of dividends. 
In the test performed by Elton and Gruber [1970], they examined to what 
extent the dividend yields of shares and the dividend payout ratio determine the 
scope of owners of shares. In their hypotheses, investors with higher tax rates 
would choose securities with small dividend payouts, while investors with 
lower tax rates would prefer securities with large dividend yields in order to 
realize their respective tax benefits. Their studies succeeded in confirming the 
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hypothesis that there is a strong negative relationship between the clientele’s 
share tax rate range and their share dividend payout. The results of subsequent 
empirical tests have been largely the same: Blume et al. [1974]4, Long [1977], 
Allen and Michaely [2002], and Graham & Kumar [2005] carried out research 
on the basis of US samples; Dahlquist et al. [2007] in Sweden strengthened 
the hypotheses of the model by finding a systematic relationship between the 
structuring of individual portfolios and share dividend yields. 
In the static model there is no regular trading – this model is relevant when 
the transaction costs of trading are excessively large, and therefore the benefits 
of tax minimization to be realized by means of multiple trading (that is, a 
dynamic strategy) are overruled by the associated disadvantages. To evade 
the tax disadvantages of dividends, the simplest recipe offered by the static 
model is for investors with marginal tax rates greater than their capital gains 
tax rate to refrain from holding dividend-paying shares. 
1.2 Dynamic models
The assumption underlying dynamic models is that investors do not take 
their optimal positions statically, but rather maximize the taxed value of these 
positions by means of continuous trading. In the static model, investors react 
only to changes in the investment environment (taxation, dividend policy, 
other new information), seek new equilibrium, and maintain their positions 
until there is another change in determinant factors. In contrast, investors in 
dynamic models follow a strategy that generates trading even without changes 
in the dividend policy of the company or the taxation environment.
The essence of dynamic strategies developed in view of tax implications 
is that at the time of dividend payment, investors implement such a trading 
strategy where their after-tax earnings are maximized. Stakeholders incurring 
a disadvantageous tax situation with respect to dividends will sell their 
securities to those who pay taxes on dividends at a more favorable rate, or 
at least the same rate, as with capital gains. After dividend payment, reverse 
transactions are also concluded, meaning that both groups of actors will hold 
those volumes and positions they had initially targeted in the long run. 
A forerunner of the modeling of this dynamic strategy was Kalay [1982]. 
In his model, if a perfect market is assumed (or to be more precise, if market 
imperfections are embodied only in the form of taxes), i.e., there are no 
transaction costs, access to information is perfect, and no institutional contracts 
4 Cited by Allen & Michaely [2002]
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for trading exist, then through trading investors can fully eliminate the tax 
disadvantages of the tax on dividends. In this approach, as trading associated 
with dividend payment is limited to just a few days, no considerable time 
risks arise, and the given situation in fact turns into arbitrage. In this context, 
it is perfect arbitrage options that ensure that the drop in the ex-dividend 
price should correspond to the actual volume of the dividend, but cannot be 
smaller.
Kalay [1982] claimed that conventional (i.e. static) dividend-based clientele 
models were non-existent, because at the time of dividend payment, investors 
relied on arbitrage activities to get rid of their tax payment obligations on 
dividends. It has been observed through a number of studies of capital 
markets throughout the world – for instance, in the United States, Italy, Japan, 
Sweden, and Norway – that significant turnover occurs at dividend payment 
time. This turnover positively correlates with the amounts of dividends paid, 
but negatively correlates with transaction costs and the risks of the interim 
period.
1.2.1 Empirical tests of dynamic trading
In opposition to the statements of Kalay [1982], a number of publications 
have questioned the efficiency of arbitrage trading. Elton & Gruber [1970], 
Poterba & Summers [1984]5, and even Kalay [1982] observed that price drops 
due to dividend payments were smaller than the volumes of the associated 
dividends, meaning that the arbitrage effectuated in order to eliminate the 
disadvantages of the tax on dividend did not function perfectly. Michaely & 
Vila [1995]6 found that at dividend payment time only a very small proportion 
of shares – in general less than 1% of the outstanding shares – were transferred, 
and furthermore, some of these transactions took place within the same tax 
group. (Allen & Michaely [2002]). 
In practice, the occurrence of complete arbitrage is hindered by the existence 
of transaction costs as well. Kalay thought that investors effectuate arbitrage 
as long as it is worth it for them in view of given transaction costs. In his 
opinion, price decreases due to dividend payments (as well as their ratios in 
relation to dividend per share) primarily reflect the differences between tax 
benefits and transaction costs which prevent further trading, and not purely 
5 Cited by Allen & Michaely [2002]
6 Cited by Allen & Michaely [2002]
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dividend tax rates. Others have come to similar conclusions; tests conducted 
by Michaely & Vila [1996] and Michaely et. al. [1997]7 confirmed that 
volumes associated with the dynamic trading strategy decreased in number as 
a result of transaction costs and increased risks.
Dynamic tax minimization models have a number of practical consequences, 
and the associated effects can as also be perceived in Hungary, for example, 
around dividend payment timing for shares carrying large dividend yields. 
1.2.2 Theoretical framework of the model
The model explained by Kalay [1982] has substantial practical 
consequences. The model concerns dynamic tax minimization, meaning 
that at dividend payment time, investors in various tax brackets are able to 
effectuate tax arbitrage by means of trading activities. The associated effects 
can be perceived, e.g., in Hungary, at dividend payment time, on shares with 
considerable dividend yields. For this reason, this theory is explained in 
detail.
Hereunder, tax arbitrage is defined as a type of share trading activity 
executed for the purpose of reducing the aggregate tax payment obligation 
(sum of the tax on dividend and capital gains tax) of the participants. As a 
result of the arbitrage, all participating actors typically see their tax payment 
obligations reduced, yet within the context of the model it is sufficient to 
assume that the obligations of at least one stakeholder decrease, while none 
of the actors are subject to increased payable taxes. 
Kalay’s conclusion is based on the fact that there are no obstacles to 
arbitrage - for instance, trading is not hindered by capacity (position) 
problems. Arbitrage occurs due to the fact that there are at least two groups 
of investors whose circumstances differ regarding taxes on dividends.8 Let’s 
firstly assume that investors are indifferent as to how these rates are related to 
the volume of the capital gains tax. The first group may be termed H (H as in 
‘high’ for high tax rates), and the other L (L as in ‘low’ for low tax rates). The 
associated indications are:
T
DH
 – rate of the tax on dividend for those with large incomes,
T
DL
 – rate of the tax on dividend for those with small incomes,
7 Cited by Allen & Michaely [2002]
8  Kalay assumes the presence of private persons in both investor groups with their capital gain 
taxes are identical. If capital gain taxes are different, then for arbitrage it is also necessary to 
have a different ratio of tax rate on dividend to rate of capital gains tax in the two groups.
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T
pg
 – rate of the capital gains tax,
P
A
 – price before dividend payment (cum-dividend price),
P
B
 – ex-dividend price,
DIV – dividend per share,
and T
DL
 <T
DH.
.
The volume of the after-tax dividend for group H is DIV*(1-T
DH 
), and for 
group L is DIV*(1-T
DL
). It is compensated for by a drop in the share price, 
which therefore equates to tax savings on the capital gains tax. For the two 
distinct groups, the general form of the price decrease that makes participants 
indifferent to trading, or in other words, functions as the equivalent of the 
dividend profit gain, is:
(PB-PA) = 
pg
D
T
TDIV 

1
1*
Equation (1) can be applied to group L and H accordingly, with the following 
conversions:
Group L: (PB-PA)L = 
pg
DL
T
TDIV 

1
1*  
Group H: (PB-PA)H = 
pg
DH
T
TDIV 

1
1*  
As T
DL
 <T
DH
, thus (P
B
-P
A
)
L 
> (P
B
-P
A
)
H
If there were only H investors with high tax rates, the market price would drop 
to a smaller extent in comparison with the situation where solely L investors 
with low tax rates existed. For instance, if the share price is 1,000 and the 
dividend per share is 100, and H and L tax rates on dividends are 20% and 10% 
respectively, while the capital gains tax rate is 10%, then the arbitrage-neutral 
position for H would cause a drop in price of 88.8 (100*0.8/0.9), and a drop of 
100 for L (100*0.9/0.9). Therefore, H investors target an ex-dividend price of 
911.1, whereas L investors prefer 900. For investor L, it is a good bargain to 
purchase the share before dividend payment, and thereafter sell it between 900 
and 911.1, whereas H would prefer to sell it prior to dividend payment, and 
repurchase the share in the same price range after dividend payout.
Consequently, for both groups, an arbitrage option arises to the extent of 
a decrease in price of somewhere between (P
B
-P
A
)
L 
and
 
(P
B
-P
A
)
H
. As long as 
at least one of the groups realizes its fully intended position (all H investors 
sell their securities, or all L investors purchase the largest possible volume), 
(2)
(3)
(1)
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the arbitrage situation survives. The actual extent of the price drop within the 
given price decrease range depends on the mutually-related trading volumes 
of the two groups. If the capacity of the L actors is stronger, they will cause 
the cum-dividend purchase prices to rise sharply, while bringing down the 
selling prices after the dividend payment, and therefore the decrease in price 
will approximate the (P
B
-P
A
)
L
 value regarded to be the limit value for them 
(this is what Kalay suggests in the model). 
Using the figures in the above example, the last L investor, for example, may 
pay 1,005 for the share with the dividend coupon, and sell for 906 without 
the dividend coupon. In this case, their profit gain is –99, with its (negative) 
tax, i.e., the reimbursable amount of tax or tax savings is +9.9. The value of 
the dividend they receive is 100, and the tax on the dividend is 10. The total 
earning of the L investor is therefore +0.9. 
Investor H realizes a profit gain of 99, whose tax is –9.9. At the same time, 
he does not collect the dividend of 100, which would only be worth 80 after the 
tax payment, meaning that on the whole his position improves by 9.1. In the 
opposite case, group H would like to enforce their will against the other group, 
and for this reason they push down the price before dividend payment due to 
selling pressure, while increasing the ex-dividend price through purchasing 
pressure, and therefore the price drop approximates value (P
B
-P
A
)
H,
 deemed 
to be their limit value. If both groups have retained unsatisfied capacity, or 
transaction costs hinder the exploitation of arbitrage opportunities, the price 
drop can fall anywhere within the range. What is constant is the joint profit 
of the two groups (and the loss for the state), which amounts to a difference 
in price which is still acceptable for the two actors - being taxed with the 
combined tax rate of capital gains thus:
(
pg
DL
T
TDIV 

1
1* -
pg
DH
T
TDIV 

1
1* )*(1-Tpg) = DIV*(TDH-TDL) 
With the use of the figures in the above example, the result of the jointly 
achievable arbitrage in conformance with (4) is: 
(100 * 0.9/0.9 – 100 * 0.8/0.9) * 0.9 = 100 * (0.9 – 0.8) = 10
The final conclusion of Kalay’s above-mentioned theory, i.e., that actors 
are able to evade the tax on dividend entirely, is true only when investors 
with high tax rates can all close their positions prior to dividend payment – 
(4)
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meaning that investors with low tax rates can absorb all those securities from 
the market that are still available for sale before dividend payment.
If there are more than two groups, arbitrage options are available in the 
broadest possible range for actors with the highest tax rates. The arbitrage 
option is also available to investors with middling tax rates, but it is not 
obvious to them whether they should long or short the security: it depends 
on the price range within which the trading activities of the two extreme (and 
other) groups move. According to Kalay’s assumption, the combined outcome 
is tax savings, but not all groups can save on their taxes on dividend even if 
the tax rate on dividend exceeds the capital gains tax rate for all of them. It 
may be more profitable for them to “take over” the tax on dividend imposed 
on actors with high tax rates in consideration of the expected larger capital 
gain (i.e., a smaller price drop). Again, the market becomes fully clarified if 
investors with the lowest tax rates are able to acquire the shares sold by all the 
other groups with higher tax rates prior to dividend payment.
The extent of exploitable tax arbitrage is drastically increased if institutional 
investors are also involved in activities. In most of the capital markets, 
corporate investors are taxed under different principles in comparison with 
private actors: for dividends received from other companies, corporate 
investors are generally granted tax benefits (such as in the United States and 
Germany), and furthermore, sometimes benefit from complete exemption 
from tax (Hungary). Consequently, Pareto’s optimal price range further 
opens.
2. THE MODEL OF DYNAMIC 
TAX MINIMIZATION IN PRACTICE
2.1 The possibility of dynamic tax minimization in Hungary
As regards the Hungarian investment climate, only two types of clienteles 
can be distinguished: corporate and private person investors. Private persons 
pay taxes on dividends and income from capital gains as separate income. The 
only potential difference that can be detected when the incomes of private 
persons are observed is that under certain conditions (capital account, company 
listed on the stock exchange) they are liable to pay taxes at a more favorable 
tax rate or in the case of dividends exceeding 30% of adjusted equity, the 
payable taxes are (were) calculated at a more unfavorable dividend tax rate. 
Regarding companies listed on the stock exchange, for which the payment of 
dividends over the above limit (30% of the adjusted equity) to effectuate the 
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35% rate does not occur.  By holding shares listed on the stock, two groups of 
private persons have been specified: investors with “normal rates” and those 
with preferential tax rates. (See Table 1.)
Tax rates show substantial differences, which tempt various investors to 
dynamically minimize their tax burdens. To measure the potential extent 
of tax minimization, the first step should be the application of formula (1), 
defined as the equivalent of the gain on dividend:
 (PB-PA) = 
pg
D
T
TDIV 

1
1*  
By rearranging the equation, the ratio of tax implications can express a 
price in the equivalent of a USD 100 dividend for a given investor, i.e., what 
the equivalent of the gain on dividend is.
(PB-PA) / DIV = 
pg
D
T
T


1
1  
T* =  100 * 
pg
D
T
T


1
1  
wherein
T
D
 – tax rate on dividend,
T
pg
 – rate of capital gains tax,
T*– volume of the capital gain which ensures the same after-tax profit as 
100 units of dividend (the equivalent of 100 units of gain on dividend).
(5)
(6)
(7)
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Table 1 Tax rates of private persons and companies on dividend incomes
and capital gains, 1990–2010
Private person Company
Capital gains tax Tax on dividend
Capital 
gains 
Tax on
Normal
Capital 
account
Normal1
Listed 
company
tax2 dividend
1990 20% 20% 20% 20% 35% 35%
1991 20% 20% 20% 20% 35% 35%
1992 20% 20% 10% 10% 40% 40%
1993 20% 20% 10% 10% 40% 40%
1994 20% 20% 10% 10% 36% 36%
1995 10% 10% 10% 10% 18% 18%
1996 10% 0% 10% 10% 18% 10%
1997 10% 0% 10% 10% 18% 0%
1998 20% 0% 20% 20% 18% 0%
1999 20% 0% 20% 20% 18% 0%
2000 20% 0% 20% 20% 18% 0%
2001 20% 0% 20% 20% 18% 0%
2002 20% 0% 20% 20% 18% 0%
2003 20% 0% 20% 20% 18% 0%
2004 20% 0% 20% 20% 16% 0%
2005 25% 0% 20% 20% 16% 0%
2006 25% 0% 25% 25% 16% 0%
2006.09.01 25% 0% 29%5 14%6 20%4 4%
2007 25% 20% 39%7 24%8 20%4 4%
2008 25% 20% 39%7 24%8 20%4 4%
2009 25% 20% 39%7 24%8 20%4 4%
2010 25% 20% 39%7 24%8 19% 0%
Source: Tax regulations, authors’ calculation
1  Private persons pay 35% tax on dividends 
received if the value of the dividend exceeds 
30% of the equity.
2 Assuming positive after-tax profit.
3 For companies listed on the stock exchange.
4 16% corporate income tax + 4% solidarity tax.
5  25% + 4% health contribution (EHO); not to 
be paid if investor has already reached the 
400.000 HUF limit).
6  10% + 4% health contribution (EHO); not to 
be paid if investor has already reached the 
400.000 HUF limit).
7  25% + 14% health contribution (EHO); not 
to be paid if investor has already reached the 
400.000 HUF limit).
8  10% + 14% health contribution (EHO); not 
to be paid if investor has already reached the 
400.000 HUF limit).
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On the basis of the formula, the amount of capital gain that should be 
granted to the market actor to supply the same amount of after-tax income 
as if a dividend of 100 HUF were furnished can be established – or in other 
words, what the equivalent of a gain on dividend of 100 HUF is. Obviously, 
any value over 100 indicates a more favorable tax rate for the dividend, and 
vice versa.
Apart from the starting year of 1990, within the eighteen annual periods 
of nine years of changes in tax rates observed; in 2006, there were changes 
twice. The most important change for companies was a reduction in taxes 
in 1995; with regard to increases, the most recent one which took place in 
September 2006 should arouse the most vivid memories. For private persons 
the income tax rates of  withholding tax shrank from 1994 to 1996, and then 
increased from 1998 to September 2006 on several occasions. These changes 
are examined with respect to how much the different tax rates of the various 
actors could be exploited with the use of arbitrage.
Since 1996, corporate investors have had clear tax benefits in the form 
of dividend payments, as the dividends these investors received from other 
companies are exempt from taxes, while the capital gain is deemed to be 
a part of the corporate income tax base, and thus subject to payment of 
corporate income tax. Since 1998, taxation conditions have been changed 
on several occasions. From 1996 to 2001, stock exchange shares – provided 
that they were held in capital accounts – exempted private investors from 
the effects of the capital gains tax.9 Therefore, private investors had clear 
benefits in assuming profit gains during this period.  This means that between 
1996–2001, the  two groups of investors enjoyed not only comparative, but 
absolute tax advantages in one or in the other tax type. At dividend payment 
time, institutional investors ‘should have’ bought, while private investors 
‘should have’ sold.
9  The context described below is described in relation to private investors who hold their 
investments in capital accounts
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Table 2 Equivalent of a gain on dividend of 100 HUF for various 
market actors in Hungary, 1990–2010 (in HUF)
Investor group
Private
Company
Normal Preferential1
1990 100.00 100.00 100.00
1991 100.00 100.00 100.00
1992 112.50 112.50 100.00
1993 112.50 112.50 100.00
1994 112.50 112.50 100.00
1995 100.00 100.00 100.00
1996 100.00 90.00 109.76
1997 100.00 90.00 121.95
1998 100.00 80.00 121.95
1999 100.00 80.00 121.95
2000 100.00 80.00 121.95
2001 100.00 80.00 121.95
2002 100.00 100.00 121.95
2003 100.00 80.00 121.95
2004 100.00 80.00 119.05
2005 106.67 80.00 119.05
2006 100.00 75.00 119.05
2006.09.01 94.67 86.00 120.00
2007 81.33 95.00 120.00
2008 81.33 95.00 120.00
2009 81.33 95.00 120.00
2010 81.33 95.00 123.46
Source: Authors’ calculation on the basis of Table 1 
1 When we assume the kind of private investor who is able to exploit the existing tax benefits in 
relation to both the capital gains tax and tax on dividend – for instance, an investor who holds 
stock exchange shares in a capital account.
Table 2 illustrates the amount of dividend that offers a relative tax benefit in 
comparison with capital gains (the equivalent of capital gains) as regards the 
three examined groups of actors (private investors being subject to general tax 
rates, private investors eligible for tax benefits and corporate investors). To 
aid in understanding, the data of Table 2 are also presented in Figure 2.
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Figure 2 Equivalent of a gain on dividend of 100 HUF in Hungary, 
from 1990 to 2010
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The calculation of potential arbitrage is hindered by the fact that any two 
actors would pay different taxes on capital gains (or save via tax losses). 
Therefore, tax savings on the capital gains tax can be realized exclusively 
by corporate actors, and only if they have made losses (prior to dividend 
payment they make purchases at larger cum-dividend prices, and after 
dividend payment they sell at smaller ex-dividend prices). 
The arbitrage possibilities in connection with the tax on dividend and the 
capital gains tax are hereby handled separately, and also how prices change 
within the price range appropriate for arbitrage is examined separately. In 
between the two extreme values, the value of tax savings is linear, and therefore 
the calculated values are presented only for these two extreme values.
Savings of the private person in terms of tax on dividend: 
DIV * T
D
   (8)
wherein T
D
 is the tax rate on dividend for the private person.
After dividend payment, the minimum price decrease should be such that it 
makes it worthwhile for the private person to sell the share prior to dividend 
payment, and repurchase the same after dividend payment: 
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DIV * (1-T
D
) (9)
After dividend payment, the maximum price decrease should be such that 
it makes it worthwhile for the corporate actor to purchase the share prior to 
dividend payment, and sell the same after dividend payment (assuming that 
the company shows a profit and therefore pays corporate income tax):  
DIV / (1-T
C
)  (10)
On the basis of (9) and (10), the potential price drop range is:
DIV * (1-T
D
) < P
A
 – P
B
 < DIV / (1-T
C
)  (11)
By using equation 11, a price loss tax savings value can be calculated in 
connection with the execution of arbitrage positions for a profitable corporate 
actor (depending on whether the price drop falls to the minimum limit 
value for the private actor, or the maximum, meaning the limit value for the 
corporate actor):
DIV * (1-T
D
) * T
C
 < P
A
 – P
B
 < DIV / (1-T
C
) * T
C
 (12)
By adding up the tax savings of the private actor and corporate actor (that 
is, the sum of (8) and (9)), the effective range of total tax savings is:
Minimum: DIV * T
D
 + DIV * (1-T
D
)* T
C
 < P
A
 – P
B
 
 
(13)
Maximum:  P
A
 – P
B
 < DIV * T
D
 + DIV / (1-T
C
) * T
C 
(14)
For the calculation of potential arbitrage opportunities in detail, see the 
Appendix.
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Table 3  The amount originating from the payment of a dividend of 100 HUF
in arbitrage between companies and private persons, 1990–2010 (in HUF)
Relationship of a private person 
with normal tax payment and a 
company 
Relationship of a private person 
with preferential tax payment and 
a company
Year Normal Company Preferential Company
1990 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1991 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1992 10.00 7.50 10.00 7.50
1993 10.00 7.50 10.00 7.50
1994 10.00 8.00 10.00 8.00
1995 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1996 8.78 8.00 19.76 16.20
1997 19.76 18.00 31.95 26.20
1998 17.56 18.00 41.95 34.40
1999 17.56 18.00 41.95 34.40
2000 17.56 18.00 41.95 34.40
2001 17.56 18.00 41.95 34.40
2002 17.56 18.00 17.56 18.00
2003 17.56 18.00 41.95 34.40
2004 15.24 16.00 39.05 32.80
2005 9.29 10.40 39.05 32.80
2006 14.29 16.00 44.05 37.00
2006.09.01 19.00 20.27 34.00 27.20
2007 29.00 30.93 20.00 20.00
2008 29.00 30.93 20.00 20.00
2009 29.00 30.93 20.00 20.00
2010 31.59 34.12 22.77 23.05
Source: Authors’ own calculations  (The data presented in this table indicate the potential volume 
of profit to be realized, provided that for a given actor, the trading was performed at optimal 
prices, while the other party generated no profit.)
For each year from 1990 to 2010, the percentage of the dividend (in 
aggregate earnings) that could be realized by both actors owing to the tax 
arbitrage positions of corporate and private investors has been calculated. 
For the individual actors, the above-described capital gain equivalent of the 
dividend has been established as well. Thereafter, the difference of the capital 
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gain equivalent for the two potential partners10 has been adjusted for the capital 
gains tax  – using the tax rates for private persons in the first column, and for 
companies in the second column. The results are presented in Table 3.
To make the data in the table more transparent, two diagrams have been 
prepared to show the potential range of arbitrage opportunities between a 
private person who pays taxes on the basis of general tax rates and a corporate 
investor (Figure 3), and a private person who pays taxes at preferential tax 
rates and a company (Figure 4). 
Figure 3 Arbitrage opportunities between 1990 – 2010 for a dividend of 100 HUF 
between a private person paying normal taxes and a company (in HUF)
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Source: Authors’ calculation (The data presented in the figure indicate the potential volume of 
profit to be realized, provided that for a given actor, the trading was performed at optimal prices, 
while the other party generated no profit.)
10  The option of arbitrage has been studied only in relation to a company – private person or 
company – preferred private person (a private person paying taxes at preferential tax rates). 
The third option, i.e., the private person and private person paying taxes at preferential tax 
rates, cannot in fact occur within the framework of arbitrage, because the tax benefits are 
mainly dependent on the given securities – if some benefit has been effected, virtually all the 
actors rely on the opportunity offered by the capital account. 
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As the figure reflects, the years of 1990–91 and 1995 can be regarded as 
arbitrage-free. It also shows that the objectives of the tax reforms did not focus 
primarily on the elimination of arbitrage options. Tax reform measures taken in 
1995 ruled out the rather moderate arbitrage opportunities that had been in place 
up to that time. The potential for arbitrage was enhanced by the tax benefits 
provided to private stakeholders in 1996 (capital gains tax exemption of shares 
held in security accounts), as well as the exemption of companies from the tax on 
dividend in effect from 1996, while the changes in September 2006 (for shares 
traded on the stock exchange, the tax rate on dividend was reduced from 25% to 
10%) narrowed their scope (see figure 4 for arbitrage opportunities for private 
persons with preferential tax rates).  If we assume a liquid market (the stock 
market with its preferential taxes), and that the intense exploitation of arbitrage 
opportunities is associated mainly with stock exchanges, from September 2006 
arbitrage opportunities can be deemed to be moderate. However, the recent 
changes in 2010 which have seen the cancellation of the extra 4% corporate tax 
rate seem to again widen arbitrage possibilities.
Figure 4 Arbitrage opportunities between 1990 – 2010 for a dividend of 100 HUF 
between a private person paying preferential taxes and a company (in HUF)
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Source: Authors’ own calculation  (The data presented in the figure indicate the potential volume 
of profit to be realized, provided that for a given actor, the trading was performed at optimal 
prices, while the other party generated no profit.)
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Let’s assume there are four potential transactions between a private investor 
and a company (one trading to and from) and altogether they pay a 1% 
transaction fee. We can calculate that in 2010: 
–  A security listed on the stock market (a 23% gain in arbitrage) should 
have at least a (1 / 0.23) = 4.4% dividend yield,
–  A security not listed on the stock market (a 34% gain in arbitrage) should 
have at least (1 / 0,34) = 3% dividend yield.
Therefore, the arbitrage situation would be profitable. And there were 
numerous shares which guaranteed such a high dividend yield.
2.2 Testing the dynamic tax minimization strategy in Hungary
For this section we tested to see if investors do try to follow a dynamic 
tax minimization strategy in Hungary. We wondered if there is extremely 
high turnover in certain stocks around the dividend payout day – if there is, 
we assume that greater investor activity means selling or buying a particular 
stock so as to minimize taxes. 
Our portfolio was collected from the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) from 
1990 – 2007. The panel originally contained 97 stocks – altogether 97 stocks 
were listed in our stock market in this period. 
We used three filters for the sample: one for the period and two for the 
stocks. In the first years, between 1990 and 1994, we had less stocks and 
lower turnover – which is why our panel starts only in 1995.
From the stocks we chose only the ones which paid a dividend in the 
particular year. Evidently, this filter was necessary to test investors’ activity 
around the dividend payment day. The last filter was liquidity – we examined 
only those stocks which traded at least 100 days in the given year. The 
t-statistics we used for testing the strategy required certain stability in the 
turnover – if a stock traded only a few days in a year, the distribution of the 
turnover and the validity of our test could be called into question. Forty-one 
stocks remained in the sample. Some of them represent only a single year of 
activity, and only two stocks, Egis and Richter, are represented for each of 
the 13 years – the 41 stocks altogether represent 223 pieces of annual data 
for this period.
In the test we tried to find out if there was abnormal turnover in certain 
stocks around the dividend payment day. First, for every stock and every year 
we found the dividend payment day. On the Budapest Stock Exchange one 
can trade with a dividend coupon until the eighth working day before the 
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dividend is paid. Next, we established a five-day and a twenty-day window 
before and after that day – so altogether for every year we established four 
testing periods. If during these periods there was abnormal turnover in a given 
stock, we assumed that the aim of the trade was possibly to implement the tax 
minimizing strategy. We calculated the logarithm of the turnover for every 
day for every stock, and calculated the yearly average and standard deviation 
of the daily turnover for every stock. We assumed that the turnover of the 
five-day and twenty-day windows and the whole year’s turnover come from 
the same sample, so we used t-statistics to test the abnormal turnovers. 
This statistic is for the five-day window (at a 95.5% significance level):
daysyearsdays xx 55 *2 Vt   (15)
This is the statistic for the twenty-day window (at a 95.5% significance 
level):
Daysyearsdays xx 2020 *2 Vt   (16)
Where x  is the average from the logarithmic data of the turnover,
and σ is the standard deviation of the logarithmic data of the daily turnover, 
calculated for a five-day and a twenty-day period, respectively.
Our hypothesis is that if equation (15) is valid, then there is abnormal 
turnover in the (+5)-day or (-5)-day window around the dividend payment 
day, and if equation (16) is valid, then there is abnormal turnover in the 
(+/-20)-day window.
It is quite interesting that the total sample contains 224 pieces of annual 
data, and from them there was abnormal turnover in 103 cases. If we were 
to examine four theoretically independent windows at a 95.5% significance 
level, theoretically, 16.8 cases out of 100 would show significant turnover11. 
In our sample we have a much higher frequency of abnormal turnover, (103 / 
224 = 46%), so almost every second stock showed abnormal turnover around 
the dividend payment date. In addition, we examined 896 windows (4 X 224), 
and at a 95.5% significance level we found 220 cases, almost one-fourth of 
the total, in which there is abnormal return. So it appears that investors do 
generate great activity around the dividend payment day.
11 1 - 0,9554 = 1–0,832 = 0,168
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Table 4 Significant turnover by years
Years The whole sample Stocks with significant turnover
Number of  
stocks
Average 
dividend yields
Number of 
stocks
Average 
dividend yields
1995 13 3.26% 5 4.34%
1996 17 2.37% 11 2.37%
1997 20 3.45% 16 3.14%
1998 19 6.84% 8 5.95%
1999 22 6.45% 1 0.48%
2000 23 7.57% 5 6.32%
2001 21 6.09% 8 6.37%
2002 17 7.26% 13 7.98%
2003 16 6.24% 13 6.39%
2004 15 5.36% 4 5.42%
2005 15 3.94% 10 3.94%
2006 12 3.52% 8 3.92%
2007 14 4.59% 1 9.14%
Together 224
5.14% (simple)
5.32% 
(weighted)
103
5.06% (simple)
5.02%
(weighted)
We thought that greater activity would concern stocks with higher dividend 
yields, but this appears to be false, as this did not apply to the given years, or 
the given stocks. It appears that there is great activity in those years in which 
the average dividend yield is not very high (as in 1996, 1997, and 2005). 
It is also interesting that the average dividend yield for stocks showing 
abnormal turnover is a bit lower than the average for the whole sample. So 
it appears that investors tried to avoid dividend taxation on stocks of both a 
higher and lower dividend yield.
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Table 5 Statistics on abnormal turnover
Number of 
annual data 
Theoretical 
data
Total sample 224 100%
Showing abnormal turnover in any window 103 16.8% = 38*
Abnormal turnover for both in the five-day and 20-day 
window 
54
Abnormal turnover both before and after the dividend 
day at least in one window
45 0,9**
Abnormal turnover for both before and after the dividend 
day for both in the five-day and twenty-day window
17
*Assuming that the five-day and twenty-day panels are independent – although it is not true. In 
assuming independence, the probability is Pr = 1 –  (1 – 0.955)4= 0.168
**Assuming that the five-day and twenty-day panels are independent – although it is not true. In 
assuming independence, the probability is Pr = (1 –  (1 – 0.955)2)2 = 0.004
If there is abnormal turnover both before and after the dividend payment 
day, then it is likely that there is tax arbitrage in the given stock – certain 
investors buy the stock before the dividend is paid and sell it just after the 
payment, and other investors sell it before dividend payment and then buy it 
back afterwards. If the turnover data are independent from each other, then 
from 224 pieces of data we would have had only 0.9 pieces of data showing 
higher activity both before and after the dividend payment period – but in 
fact we have 45 pieces of data. If we look at the other data in Table 5, we 
recognize even greater arbitrage activity than we would have assumed if the 
data had related to independent turnover.
We gathered those stocks that were the most interesting ones for investors 
executing tax-arbitrage transactions. We selected those stocks showing 
abnormal turnover data of at least five times, and 25% of the tests.
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Table 6 Stocks showing frequent abnormal turnover
Stock
Total 
years
Years showing 
abnormal turnover
Total abnormal 
turnover in the tests 
number % number %
Borsodchem 10 3 30.00 12 30.00
Brau 7 3 42.86 7 25.00
Dédász 5 2 40.00 6 30.00
Démász 7 4 57.14 9 32.14
Édász 5 2 40.00 5 25.00
Egis 13 8 61.54 15 28.85
Émász 6 4 66.67 6 25.00
Inter-Európa 10 6 60.00 17 42.50
Magyar Telekom 10 7 70.00 15 37.50
MOL 12 7 58.33 15 31.25
OTP 10 4 40.00 10 25.00
Prímagáz 6 4 66.67 7 29.17
Richter 13 6 46.15 15 28.85
Titász 5 2 40.00 7 35.00
Zwack 12 8 66.67 13 27.08
Total 131 70 36.59 159 30.34
From the 41 examined stocks, there were fifteen (37%) that met the criteria. 
These fifteen stocks represent 131 years of company data, a bit less than 60% 
of the whole sample – 70 years showed abnormal turnover (68%) and there 
were 159 cases (72%) from the 220 total significant tests. The fifteen stocks 
above showed abnormal turnover in more than 50% of the years on average 
and in more than 30% of the tests we conducted.
Some interesting details from the table:
–  there was significant turnover in more than two-thirds of the years for the 
following stocks: Émász, Magyar Telekom, Prímagáz, and Zwack,
–  there is significant turnover in more than 40% of the tests for Inter-Európa 
Bank stock,
–  for the stock of Borsodchem, each test conducted for the significant years 
1997, 2002, 2004 turned out to be significant.  
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Table 7 Dividend yields of stocks showing abnormal turnover
Stock Total years
Years 
showing 
abnormal 
turnover
Dividend 
yield, average 
(%)
Dividend 
yield during 
abnormal 
turnover years 
(%)
Borsodchem 10 3 5.19 3.10 
Brau 7 3 6.18 7.53 
Dédász 5 2 8.53 10.56 
Démász 7 4 9.08 9.01 
Édász 5 2 9.73 8.17 
Egis 13 8 0.96 0.95 
Émász 6 4 6.48 7.17 
Inter-Európa 10 6 5.35 6.10 
Magyar Telekom 10 7 4.63 5.33 
MOL 12 7 1.39 1.24 
OTP 10 4 1.77 1.90 
Prímagáz 6 4 6.62 7.86 
Richter 13 6 1.70 1.84 
Titász 5 2 8.89 9.07 
Zwack 12 8 8.41 8.00 
Total 131 70
5.14  
(weighted)
4.72 
(weighted)
5.96  (simple)
5.50 
(simple)
It is interesting to note that the average dividend yield of the shares in the 
years with abnormal turnover is not higher than the average dividend yield in 
the whole sample (the dividend yield for the whole sample was 5.14%, using a 
weighted method, and 5.32% using a simple average; for the fifteen stocks and 
for the significant years these data are 5.14% and 5.96%, respectively.) But 
there is a significant difference between the total average of the dividend yield 
for these fifteen stocks, and the average dividend yield for just the significant 
years. So it appears that investors mostly used the possibility of arbitrage in 
those years in which the dividend yield was higher for the given stocks.
It is also interesting to examine in what years we had the most frequent 
significant turnover.
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Table 8 Connection between tax-keys, dividend yields and abnormal turnover, 
1995-2007 (%)
Potential 
arbitrage of 
a 100 HUF 
dividend*
Percentage of 
stocks showing 
abnormal return
Average 
dividend yield 
for all stocks
Average 
dividend yield 
for stocks 
showing 
abnormal 
turnover
1995 0.00 38.46 3.26 4,34 
1996 19.76 64.71 2.37 2,37 
1997 31.95 80.00 3.45 3,14 
1998 41.95 42.11 6.84 5,95 
1999 41.95 4.55 6.45 0,48 
2000 41.95 21.74 7.42 6,32 
2001 41.95 38.10 6.09 6,37 
2002 17.56 76.47 7.26 7,98 
2003 41.95 81.25 6.24 6,39 
2004 39.05 26.67 5.36 5,42 
2005 39.05 73.33 3.94 3,94 
2006 44.05 66.67 3.52 3,92 
2007 20.00 7.14 4.59 9,14 
Correlation with the potential  
arbitrage 
-0.019 +0.415 +0.008
* Relationship between a private person receiving preferential tax payment and a company – the 
potential volume of profit is realized by the private person, while the company generates no profit. 
In examining Table 8, we can observe that there is no statistical correlation 
between the tax possibilities and the ratio of stocks showing abnormal 
turnover in the given year. So it appears that tax arbitrage exists every year, as 
investors try to use arbitrage opportunities every year, without regard to the 
cost of the tax deduction. This hypothesis is even stronger if we examine the 
lack of correlation between the average dividend yield of the chosen stocks 
and the arbitrage opportunities. 
The only apparent connection we could find is between the average dividend 
yield and the arbitrage opportunity for the given year (Linear correlation = 
+0.415). It appears that in years in which tax rules provide greater arbitrage 
opportunities, firms pay a higher dividend yield for the benefit of arbitrageur 
investors.
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APPENDIX
In 1998, the tax rate on dividend for private persons increased from ten to 
twenty percent, and tax arbitrage between private investors and institutional 
investors promised the largest potential gains between 1998 and 2001 – this 
period did not see changes in the relevant tax rates. These tax rates have been 
used for the calculation of the potential aggregate gains of the actors from 
arbitrage, again assuming that the share price prior to the dividend payment is 
1,000 HUF, while the dividend to be paid is 100 HUF.
To calculate the total value of arbitrage, it has also been assumed that a 
Hungarian private investor sells his stock-exchange share to a Hungarian 
company somewhere between 1998 and 2001. 
The tax rates in effect in that period: 
Corporate investor (C): T
GC
 = T
C
 12= 18%, T
DC 
= 0%; 
Private person (P): T
GP
 = 0%, T
DP
 = 20%.
Tax savings due to the dividend (8): DIV * T
DP
 = 100 HUF* 0.2 = 20 HUF
Minimum of the potential price drop (9): DIV * (1-T
DP
) = 100 HUF * 0.8 = 80 HUF 
(meaning that the price can drop down to 920 HUF)
Associated tax savings: DIV * (1-T
DP
) * T
C
 = 100 HUF * 0.8 * 0.18 = 14.4 HUF
Maximum of the potential price drop (10): DIV / (1-T
C
) = 100 HUF / 0.82 = 121.95 
HUF (meaning that the price can drop down to 878.05 HUF)
Associated tax savings: DIV / (1-T
C
) * T
C
 = 100 HUF / 0.82 * 0.18 = 21.95 HUF
Total tax savings: 
Minimum (13): DIV * T
DP
 + DIV * (1-T
DP
) * T
C
 = 
 100 HUF * 0.2 + 100 HUF * 0.8 * 0.18 = 34.4 HUF
Maximum (14): DIV * T
DP
 + DIV / (1-T
C
) = 100 HUF * 0.2 + 100 HUF / 0.82 = 
  41.95 HUF 
The total tax savings due to arbitrage could potentially range from 34.4% to 
41.95% of the paid dividend. 
12 T
C
: Corporate income tax rate
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(Note that the relatively large value of tax savings is explained by the 
fact that both actors could execute efficient arbitrage at a very high price 
range: on the basis of the above example, in the ex-dividend price range from 
878.05 HUF to 920 HUF at an initial share price of 1.000 HUF and a 100 
HUF dividend payment. If in relation to the purchase price, both actors are 
to settle 0.25% transaction costs for selling and buying (1% in aggregate), 
and transaction prices ensuring maximal (41.95% of the dividend) gains are 
assumed, then the actors can effectuate arbitrage for shares of dividend yields 
of  2.38% (0.01 / 0.4195) in aggregate.)
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